AFTrain'25

Yusuf Ziya Öner Science High School Model United Nations Conference

UNSC

Agenda Item:

Gulf War

Under Secretary General:

Baran İnce

Academic Assistant:

Murat Demir Cibcir

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1)Letter from the Secretariat

Distinguished delegates,

It is with profound honor and an enduring sense of purpose that we extend our warmest welcome to you all for AFTRAIN'25. As the Secretaries General, we are genuinely honored to see this conference once again gather bright young minds who share a belief in dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation.

First and foremost, gratitude must be extended to our dedicated academic and organization teams. Without their unwavering efforts, the vision we aim to share with our generation would have never come to life.

We live in a time when global knots grow more complex every day, yet it is also a time filled with opportunities. The work you will do here represents what diplomacy truly means, the ability to seek solutions, wind up those complications and connect them across tough conditions.

On behalf of the Secretariat, we wish you an inspiring and memorable experience. Let us bow our heads, the king is back!

Kind regards,

Kaan Muştu & Ömer T. Demirel
Co-Secretaries-General

2)Letter from the Under-Secretary-General

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3)Letter from the Academic Assistant

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4)Introduction to the Committee

4.1)History of the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was established in 1945 as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security while having the power to use international force. It was created in response to the devastation of World War II, aiming to prevent future conflicts via planned security and military interventions and responses. The structure of the council was designed to reflect the geopolitical realities of the time, granting five major World powers [China, France, the Soviet Union (now represented as Russia), the United Kingdom, and the United States] permanent membership. Since its dawn, the UNSC has played a crucial role in addressing global security challenges, including Cold War issues, regional conflicts and acts of aggression internationally . Over the decades, its authority has been expanded by the UN to include peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism measures, and the enforcement of international sanctions.

4.2)Functions of the Committee

The Security Council has broad and legally binding powers under the UN Charter, giving it the power to take actions in response to threats that endangers international stability. It is responsible for authorizing peacekeeping missions, imposing economic and diplomatic sanctions and approving military interventions when necessary. The Security Council also plays a role in conflict prevention, facilitating diplomatic negotiations and recommending solutions to disputes, while acting as an arbiter power. Its resolutions are legally binding on all UN member states, giving it significant influence over global affairs. The UNSC organizes meetings when there is a need of addressing crises and its ability to act swiftly has been effective in managing conflicts in regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. However, while the Council has been successful in many instances, its effectiveness is often challenged by political disagreements among its members.

4.3)The Veto Right

A defining feature of the Security Council is the veto power granted to its five permanent members. This mechanism allows any of these nations to block the adoption of any substantive resolution, regardless of the majority vote. The veto power was established to ensure that the most powerful states remained committed to the UN’s objectives while preventing single sided actions that could undermine global stability. However, it has also been a source of controversy, as it can lead to a deadlock while decision making, particularly when permanent members have conflicting national interests. The use of the veto has been widely debated, with calls for change to make the Council more representative and effective.

A permanent member's abstention or absence does not count as a veto. A "procedural" decision (such as changing the meeting agenda or inviting a non-member to sit at a UNSC meeting) also cannot be vetoed.

5)Introduction of the Agenda Item

5.1)General Overview of the Middle Eastern and North Africa Region

Middle East, loosely defined generalization of the crosswide region that typically encompasses Southwest Asia, especially the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant, and often includes Turkey, Iran, North Africa, and sometimes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. It is typically conceived as a region between Europe and South Asia that is characterized culturally by a diverse Muslim majority, although the region also includes non-negligible size of Christian and Jewish populations. For centuries, the Middle East served as the crossroads of empires, given its location between Europe and Asia. In modern times, a different feature of the region enticed outside powers: oil. In the twentieth century, the discovery of oil fueled rivalries between foreign powers looking to exploit the resource. The region has always been an attraction for different types of religions and nations. These desires to settle and seize dominance on the region are caused due to the plentitude of natural resources, importance of the geopolitical location, cultural and historical value of the landmarks.

The Middle East has been occupied by a variety of nations and governments. The multireligious and multinational foundation of the area can be seen as the reason for the short lifespan of the formed nations. Because of this diversity among the population, this restricted area of land has seen key milestones that shaped and wrote the known history.

The examples of government-like structures are seen rarely in the perspective of the historical period. This phenomenon is caused by the peoples favor about tribalism. Tribalism can be defined as a state of being organized by, or advocating for, tribes or tribal lifestyles. Human evolution primarily occurred in small hunter-gatherer groups, as opposed to in larger and more recently settled agricultural societies or civilizations. With a negative connotation and in a political context, tribalism can also mean discriminatory behavior or attitudes towards out-groups, based on in-group loyalty. Being rival to each other created a competitive atmosphere around the early residents of the area and this led to a breaking point on the development.

After the loss of World War 1 by Central Powers, Ottomans' dominance towards the Middle East ended. The members of Allies as British Empire and France interacted with local tribal powers and persuaded them to fight against Ottomans. This act of backfire was promised with formation of free and independent nation states. Their efforts for independence lead to a great victory. Arab nationalism continued to develop into a full-fledged political movement

after World War I, taking on new forms with changing times and local contexts. Its development was largely due to the legacy of the mandate system imposed by Britain and France in the war's wake. In the face of this unjust and often violent neo-colonialism, Arab nationalism became one of several ideological visions around which Arabs mobilized to pursue a just and representative political system that would protect citizens' rights. The Arab nationalist movement's rhetoric of anti-imperialism and resistance to Western intervention in Arab affairs was rigorously spread to the masses through education and the press. Although Arab nationalism eventually fell into decline, the legacy of the Arab Revolt with its impact on the outcomes of World War I, and the ensuing instability caused by the European-created political order in the region, continues to affect the Middle East today.

5.2)Rise of Arab Nationalism

Pan-Arabism also known as Arab Nationalism can be defined as a nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins lie in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy led to a cultural and literary renaissance (known as the Nahda or *al-nahḍah al-adabiyyah*) among Arabs of the Middle East. This contributed to political agitation and led to the independence of most Arab states from the Ottoman Empire and from the European powers (by the mid-20th century). The fundamentals of this political belief gained its majority because of the Ottomans lack of sufficiency upon administration and the inadequacy of prosperity and civil opportunities provided. After the fall of Ottomans from the region in 1918; exterior forces who had pragmatistic interests in the region, primarily France and the United Kingdom, didn't follow their agreements that they made secretly before the war. This movement led to the creation of protectorated Arab nations in the lands of the Middle East. Being deceived and betrayed by colonialist states was a huge reason for the rise of nationalist ideas amongst the new Arabian generation that shaped the last quarter of the 20th century.

As a political force, Arab nationalism may be said to have begun in the decade immediately prior to World War I, when Arab subjects of the Ottoman empire began to assert their Arabness in opposition to the Turkish focus of the Committee of Union and Progress in its governance of the Ottoman state after 1908. Of success these Arabs had little until the Allies had defeated the Ottomans and set up several Arab states in the former eastern Arab wilayets (provinces) of the defunct empire. This change opened the way for Arabism to function as a legitimate political ideology in those entities. "Arab nationalism became the creed of all political activists everywhere in the Fertile Crescent except Lebanon. However, the same class of notables that had been locally dominant under the Ottomans continued to wield extensive power. As a result, Arab nationalism came to be defined by those in political opposition, and, with such definition, it progressively became their property. They were the nationalists; the notables of the ruling elite were agents of imperialism. The energies of the political elite during this interwar period were necessarily focused on gaining independence from their mandate overlords. In time, their interest and attention shifted away from general

Arab affairs to the state in which the struggle for independence and their own political fortunes were situated. By the end of World War II, the system of Arab states within boundaries drawn in European chanceries in the early 1920s was well on its way to general acceptance by dominant political forces.

Besides civil movements,the born of the Pan-Arabism is officially considered as the foundation of the Baʿth Party by Pan-Arabist thinkers Michel ʿAflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar, which formed branches in several countries and became the ruling party in Syria and Iraq in 1943. The Arab Socialist Ba'th (Resurrection) Party began its half-century of existence as a movement standing for Arab nationalism, freedom from foreign rule, and the establishment of a single Arab state. For the past quarter-century, it has been represented by two mutually hostile authoritarian regimes, those in Iraq and Syria. Each claims to be the sole legitimate inheritor of the original Ba'th legacy. In 1942, the ideological fathers of this belief devoted themselves full-time to the creation of a movement dedicated to achieving freedom (hurriyah) from foreign control and the unity (wihdah) of all Arabs in a single state. To these goals, the Baathists added socialism (ishtirakiyah), which they interpreted as social justice for the poor and underprivileged. The slogans "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" and "One Arab Nation with an Immortal Mission" appeared on party publications from the mid-1940s and continue to appear on the mastheads of the Baath newspapers in Syria and Iraq.

Another important event was the founding of the Arab League in 1945. **Arab League**, regional organization of Arab states in the Middle East and parts of Africa, formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945, as an outgrowth of Pan-Arabism. The founding member states were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan), Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Other members are Libya (1953); Sudan (1956); Tunisia and Morocco (1958); Kuwait (1961); Algeria (1962); Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (1971); Mauritania (1973); Somalia (1974); the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; 1976); Djibouti (1977); and Comoros (1993). (When Yemen was a divided country, from 1967 to 1990, the two regimes were separately represented.) Each member has one vote on the League Council, decisions being binding only on those states that have voted for them.
The aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third parties. The signing on April 13, 1950, of an agreement on joint defense and economic cooperation also committed the signatories to coordination of military defense measures.In its early years the Arab League concentrated mainly on economic, cultural, and social programs.

Pan-Arabism's most charismatic and effective proponent was Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, under whom it reached its peak in both political and social expression. This "defacto" leadership amongst the other Arab leaders was caused because of Nasser's attitude against Israel and unification of all Arabs. The aforementioned political tensions mounted again with the rise to power of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser took a hostile stance toward Israel. In 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, a vital waterway connecting Europe and Asia that was largely owned by French and British concerns. France and Britain

responded by striking a deal with Israel—whose ships were barred from using the canal and whose southern port of Eilat had been blockaded by Egypt—wherein Israel would invade Egypt; France and Britain would then intervene, ostensibly as peacemakers, and take control of the canal. In October 1956 Israel invaded Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. In five days the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) captured Gaza, Rafah, and Al-ʿArīsh—taking thousands of prisoners—and occupied most of the peninsula east of the Suez Canal. The Israelis were then in a position to open sea communications through the Gulf of Aqaba. In December, after the joint Anglo-French intervention, a UN Emergency Force was stationed in the area, and Israeli forces withdrew in March 1957. Though Egyptian forces had been defeated on all fronts, the Suez Crisis, as it is sometimes known, was seen by Arabs as an Egyptian victory. Egypt dropped the blockade of Eilat. A UN buffer force was placed in the Sinai Peninsula. This contemporary political and military balance environment lasted until the Six-Day War in June 5–10, 1967. The final conclusion was the certain and massive defeat of Arabian forces after the battles. This noncompetetive defeat against Israel led upon to the loss of Jerusalem. The tragic event triggered the people's consciousness on the defeated states. This civil raiseness impacted as the changes of governments. With Nasser's death following adjacently after the tragic defeat of the Arab world , disappointment in Pan-Arabism's inability to effectuate lasting prosperity in the Arab world led to a rise in Islamism as an alternative. Despite the decline in enthusiasm for Pan-Arabist policies, Syria's Ḥāfiẓ al-Assad, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi were among those who tried to assume the mantle of Arab leadership after Nasser.

5.3)Historical Summary of Iraq

Iraq, officially Republic of Iraq, Country, Middle East, southwestern Asia, northwest of the Persian Gulf and having its capital as the old and sacred city of Baghdad. The population consists mainly of an Arab majority and a Kurdish minority. Languages: Arabic, Kurdish (both official). Religions: Islam (official; mostly Shīʿite); also Christianity. Currency: dinar. The country can be divided into four major regions: the Tigris-Euphrates alluvial plains in central and southeastern Iraq; Al-Jazīrah, an upland region in the north between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers; deserts in the west and south, covering about two-fifths of the country; and highlands in the northeast. Iraq has the world's second largest proven reserves of petroleum, and it has substantial reserves of natural gas

The modern nation-state of Iraq was created following World War I (1914–18) from the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul . Iraq gained formal independence in 1932 but remained subject to British imperial influence during the next quarter century of turbulent monarchical rule. Political instability on an even greater scale followed the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, but the installation of an Arab nationalist and socialist regime—the Baʿath Party—in a bloodless coup 10 years later brought new stability.

Modern Iraq, created by combining three separate Ottoman provinces in the aftermath of World War I, is one of the most religiously and ethnically diverse societies in the Middle East. Although Iraq's communities generally coexisted peacefully, fault lines between communities deepened in the 20th century as a succession of authoritarian regimes ruled by exploiting tribal, sectarian, and ethnic divisions.

The ancient Semitic peoples of Iraq, the Babylonians and Assyrians, and the non-Semitic Sumerians were long ago assimilated by successive waves of immigrants. The Arab conquests of the 7th century brought about the Arabization of central and southern Iraq. A mixed population of Kurds and Arabs inhabit a transition zone between those areas and Iraqi Kurdistan in the northeast. Roughly two-thirds of Iraq's people are Arabs, about one-fourth are Kurds, and the remainder consists of small minority groups.
Iraq's Arab population is divided between Sunni Muslims and the more numerous Shiʿi Muslims. These groups, however, are for the most part ethnically and linguistically homogenous, and—as is common throughout the region—both value family relations strongly. Many Arabs, in fact, identify more strongly with their family or tribe (an extended, patrilineal group) than with national or confessional affiliations, a significant factor contributing to ongoing difficulties in maintaining a strong central government. This challenge is amplified by the numerical size of many extended kin groups—tribal units may number thousands or tens of thousands of members—and the consequent political and economic clout they wield. Tribal affiliation among Arab groups has continued to play an important role in Iraqi politics, and even in areas where tribalism has eroded with time (such as major urban centres), family bonds have remained close. Several generations may live in a single household

Although estimates of their precise numbers vary, the Kurds are reckoned to be the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, following Arabs, Turks, and Persians. There are important Kurdish minorities in Iraq concentrated in the relatively inaccessible mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, which is roughly contiguous with Kurdish regions in those other countries. Kurds constitute a separate and distinctive cultural group. The Kurdish people were thwarted in their ambitions for statehood after World War I, and the Iraqi Kurds have since resisted inclusion in the state of Iraq. At various times the Kurds have been in undisputed control of large tracts of territory. Attempts to reach a compromise with the Kurds in their demands for autonomy, however, have ended in failure, owing partly to government pressure and partly to the inability of Kurdish factional groups to maintain a united front against successive Iraqi governments. From 1961 to 1975, aided by military support from Iran, they were intermittently in open rebellion against the Iraqi government, as they were during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and again, supported largely by the United States, throughout the 1990s.

After its rise to power, the Baʿath regime of Saddam Hussein consistently tried to extend its control into Kurdish areas through threats, coercion, violence, and, at times, the forced internal transfer of large numbers of Kurds. Intermittent Kurdish rebellions in the last quarter

of the 20th century killed tens of thousands of Kurds—both combatants and noncombatants—at the hands of government forces and on various occasions forced hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee to neighbouring Iran and Turkey. Government attacks were violent and ruthless and included the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians; such incidents took place at the village of Ḥalabjah and elsewhere in 1988.

Besides the ethnic diversities, the region co-existently hosts varieties of religious beliefs. Iraq is predominantly a Muslim country, in which the two major sects of Islam are represented more equally than in any other state. About three-fifths of the population is Shiʿi, and about two-fifths is Sunni. Largely for political reasons, the government has not maintained careful statistics on the relative proportion of the Sunni and Shiʿi populations. Shiʿis are almost exclusively Arab (with some Turkmen and Kurds), while Sunnis are divided mainly between Arabs and Kurds but include other, smaller groups, such as Azerbaijanis and Turkmen.

From the inception of the Iraqi state in 1920 until the fall of the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the ruling elites consisted mainly—although not exclusively—of minority Sunni Arabs. Most Sunni Arabs follow the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence and most Kurds the Shāfiʿī school, although this distinction has lost the meaning that it had in earlier times.

The Iraqi Shiʿah, like their coreligionists in Iran, follow the Twelver (Ithnā ʿAsharī) rite, and, despite the preeminence of Iran as a Shiʿi Islamic republic, Iraq has traditionally been the physical and spiritual centre of Shiʿism in the Islamic world. Shiʿism's two most important holy cities, Najaf and Karbala, are located in southern Iraq, as is Kūfah, sanctified as the site of the assassination of ʿAlī, the fourth caliph, in the 7th century. Sāmarrāʾ, farther north, near Baghdad, is also of great cultural and religious significance to the Shiʿah as the site of the life and disappearance of the 12th, and eponymous, imam, Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥujjah. In premodern times southern and eastern Iraq formed a cultural and religious meeting place between the Arab and Persian Shiʿi worlds, and religious scholars moved freely between the two regions. Even until relatively recent times, large numbers of notable Iranian scholars could be found studying or teaching in the great madrasahs (religious schools) in Najaf and Karbala. Although Shiʿis constituted the majority of the population, Iraq's Sunni rulers gave preferential treatment to influential Sunni tribal networks, and Sunnis dominated the military officer corps and civil service. Shiʿis remained politically and economically marginalized until the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since the transition to elective government, Shiʿi factions have wielded significant political power.

6)Rise of Saddam Hussein

6.1)Early life of Saddam Hussein

Hussein was born on April 28, 1937, in Tikrit, Iraq. His father, who was a shepherd, disappeared several months before Saddam was born. A few months later, Saddam's older brother died of cancer. When Saddam was born, his mother, severely depressed by her oldest son's death and the disappearance of her husband, was unable to effectively care for Saddam, and at age three, he was sent to Baghdad to live with his uncle, Khairallah Talfah. Years later, Saddam would return to Al-Awja to live with his mother, but after suffering abuse at the hand of his stepfather, he fled to Baghdad to again live with Talfah, a devout Sunni Muslim and ardent Arab nationalist whose politics would have a profound influence on the young Saddam.

After attending the nationalistic al-Karh Secondary School in Baghdad, in 1957, at age 20, Saddam joined the Ba'ath Party, whose ultimate ideological aim was the unity of Arab states in the Middle East. On October 7, 1959, Saddam and other members of the Ba-ath Party attempted to assassinate Iraq's then-president, Abd al-Karim Qasim, whose resistance to joining the nascent United Arab Republic and alliance with Iraq's communist party had put him at odds with the Ba'athists. During the assassination attempt, Qasim's chauffeur was killed, and Qasim was shot several times, but survived. Saddam was shot in the leg. Several of the would-be assassins were caught, tried and executed, but Saddam and several others managed to escape to Syria, where Saddam stayed briefly before fleeing to Egypt, where he attended law school.

6.2)Saddam Hussein's Rise in Iraqi Government

In 1963, when Qasim's government was overthrown in the so-called Ramadan Revolution, Saddam returned to Iraq, but he was arrested the following year as the result of in-fighting in the Ba'ath Party. While in prison, however, he remained involved in politics, and in 1966, was appointed deputy secretary of the Regional Command. Shortly thereafter he managed to escape prison, and in the years that followed, continued to strengthen his political power.

In 1968, Saddam participated in a bloodless but successful Ba'athist coup that resulted in Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr becoming Iraq's president and Saddam his deputy. During al-Bakr’s presidency, Saddam proved himself to be an effective and progressive politician, albeit a decidedly ruthless one. He did much to modernize Iraq's infrastructure, industry and health-care system, and raised social services, education and farming subsidies to levels unparalleled in other Arab countries in the region. He also nationalized Iraq's oil industry, just before the energy crisis of 1973, which resulted in massive revenues for the nation. During that same time, however, Saddam helped develop Iraq's first chemical weapons program and, to guard against coups, created a powerful security apparatus, which included both Ba'athist paramilitary groups and the People's Army, and which frequently used torture, rape and assassination to achieve its goals.

The first sign that Hussein was preparing to consolidate his power in Iraq was his self-proclaimed promotion in January, 1976, to the rank of general. Such a move, by someone

who had never actually served in the military, could only have been accomplished if it were coordinated with calculated coercive methods. In fact, the growing influence of the so-called People's Militia, the armed branch of the Ba′th Party, helped Hussein in his bid for power. Recruitment to this body was stepped up, making it a potential counterweight to any discontent in the regular army.

Another sources of leverage involved Hussein's marriage ties and clan linkages to his hometown region near Tikrit. A primary example of this came in 1977 when Colonel Adnan Khairallah, President Bakr's son-in-law and brother to Hussein's wife, assumed the job of minister of defense. Another key job, running the Directorate of Intelligence, came under the control of one of Hussein's cousins, Sa′dun Shakir. Indeed, a clique-based system dominated by Tikritis gave the impression, at least until the late 1970's, of mutual confidence among members of the inner circle of political control.

Soon the Ba′th Party became the target of political adjustment. In the fall of 1977, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by Bakr and Hussein, declared that the Iraqi Ba′th's Regional Command—party officials who were expected to coordinate all Ba′thist matters via consultation with the "national command" seated in Syria—would henceforth be considered "ex officio" members of the RCC. This move implied that there would no longer be any distinction between policies of the state and policies of the party.

What began to emerge was forced loyalty to a personality cult based on the figure of Hussein. Anyone who failed to rally around Hussein's personal leadership risked becoming suspect in the eyes of the regime.

In 1979, when al-Bakr attempted to unite Iraq and Syria, in a move that would have left Saddam effectively powerless, Saddam forced al-Bakr to resign, and on July 16, 1979, Saddam became president of Iraq. President Bakr's resignation announcement on July 16, 1979, followed by the immediate succession of Hussein, was a sign that almost all Iraqi political cadres should brace for a possible purge. The first major sign of what was to come occurred when Muhyi Abd al-Hussein Mashhadi, secretary-general of the Ba′th Party, was replaced by someone closer to Hussein's personal entourage. By the end of July, the full brunt of Hussein's merciless methods of political consolidation would be felt. He announced that a Syrian-backed plot against Baghdad had been uncovered. Several members of the RCC were charged with complicity and forced to appear before a court made up of RCC members who had not been implicated. Less than a week later, he called an assembly of the Ba'ath Party. During the meeting, a list of 68 names was read out loud, and each person on the list was promptly arrested and removed from the room. Of those 68, all were tried and found guilty of treason and 22 were sentenced to death. By early August 1979, hundreds of Saddam's political foes had been executed.

6.3)Saddam Hussein's Actions During His Leadership

As president, Hussein continued his modernization program and implemented a number of measures to suppress religious conservatives. Throughout the early years of his reign, the president faced opposition from Shiite and Kurdish groups, and his power rested on the 20 percent of the population that was Sunni and who supported the Ba′thist Party. Hussein consolidated control by creating a cult of personality and launching successive campaigns of repression against his political opponents. Officially, the regime embraced pan-Arabism, but it also developed close ties with Western countries, particularly France. Hussein opposed the Camp David Accords of 1978 and sought to undermine Egypt's position as a leading force in the Middle East.

Hussein initiated a series of programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). By the early 1980's, Iraq had a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and various nerve agents. The regime used chemical weapons against opposition groups, including the Kurds. Iraq also built a nuclear reactor, but the facility was destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 1981.

In 1980, fighting broke out between Iraqi and Iranian forces over a disputed waterway. The border skirmish evolved into a full-scale war. With support from the United States and other Western powers, Hussein sought to topple the fundamentalist Shiite government of Iran and secure Iraq's place as the dominant regional power. The war lasted until 1988 and ended essentially in a stalemate, despite the loss of more than 1 million people on both sides of the conflict. The war also left Iraq with a debt of more than $75 billion.

In August, 1990, Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait in an effort to gain new resources to help pay the external debt from the Iran-Iraq War and to bolster domestic spending on social programs. Iraqi forces quickly overran Kuwait, but the invasion was condemned by the United Nations (U.N.), which authorized the formation of a U.S.-led military coalition to liberate Kuwait. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was a humiliating defeat for Hussein, whose country soon faced a series of economic and military sanctions implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The regime was ordered to destroy its WMDs under U.N. supervision, and no-fly zones were established over northern and southern Iraq (the northern Kurdish areas were able to gain a high degree of autonomy).

Throughout the 1990's, Hussein attempted to have the sanctions ended or, at minimum, reduced. He also initiated a series of smuggling operations to evade the sanctions. The U.N. Oil-for-Food Program was initiated to provide food and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, but the regime used the effort as a means to enrich senior Ba′thists. Hussein provoked air and missile strikes by the United States and allied nations on several occasions for reasons including the following: a failed plot to assassinate former U.S. president George H. W. Bush in 1993; unlawful Iraqi military action against the Kurds in 1996; and noncompliance with U.N. weapons inspections, including the forced removal of U.N. personnel in 1998. In response the United States enacted the Iraq Liberation Act (1998), in which regime change in Iraq became an official policy goal of the United States.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States , U.S. president George W. Bush identified Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as members of a so-called axis of evil seeking to destabilize the world. As tensions mounted, Hussein offered limited cooperation with new U.N. inspections. Meanwhile, the Bush administration asserted that Iraq continued to pursue WMDs and that the Iraqi regime supported international terrorists, including al-Qaeda. U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. Within a month, Baghdad had been captured and Hussein went into hiding. He was apprehended by U.S. troops on December 13, 2003. In June of the following year, Hussein was transferred to the custody of the interim Iraqi government, which announced plans to put the former dictator and senior members of his regime on trial for crimes against humanity. On November 5, 2006, after a long and controversial trial, Hussein was convicted of ordering the executions of Shiites and sentenced to death. He was hanged on December 30, 2006, in Baghdad.

7)Iraq's Relations With Border-Sharing States

7.1)Iraq-Iran War

Iran-Iraq War, (1980–88), prolonged military conflict between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s. The incredibly deadly and destructive nature of the conflict left a long legacy, including the proliferation in the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and Iran. The war placed tremendous strain on the countries' resources, a factor that precipitated Iraq's later invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (see Persian Gulf War). In Iran, which was fresh out of the 1979 Iranian Revolution when the war broke out, the existential threat facing the new Islamic Republic led its leadership to elevate hard-line figures, like Ali Khamenei (president from 1981 to 1989 and later supreme leader), over moderate supporters of the revolution, like Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (president from 1980 to 1981). The war also led to the evolution of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from a limited state militia into Iran's most powerful armed force, in part due to the zeal and relative success of its fighters over that of Iran's regular army.

7.1.1)Origins

Since the Ottoman–Persian Wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, Iran (known as "Persia" prior to 1935) and the Ottomans fought over Iraq (then known as Mesopotamia) and full control of the Shatt al-Arab until the signing of the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, which established the final borders between the two countries. The Shatt al-Arab was considered an important channel for both states' oil exports, and in 1937, Iran and the newly independent Iraq signed a treaty to settle the dispute. In the same year, Iran and Iraq both joined the Treaty of Saadabad, and relations between the two states remained good for decades afterwards.

In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty over the Shatt al-Arab river, and as such ceased paying tolls to Iraq when its ships used the waterway. The Shah justified his move by arguing that almost all river borders around the world ran along the thalweg and claiming that because most of the ships that used the waterway were Iranian, the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran. Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but when on April 24 1969, an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships sailed down the river, Iraq—the militarily weaker state—did nothing. Iran's abrogation of the treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi-Iranian tension that was to last until the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

In the 1975 Algiers Agreement, Iraq made territorial concessions—including the Shatt al-Arab waterway—in exchange for normalized relations. In return for Iraq recognizing that the frontier on the waterway ran along the entire thalweg, Iran ended its support of Iraq's Kurdish guerrillas. Iraqis viewed the Algiers Agreement as humiliating.

Tensions between Iraq and Iran were fueled by Iran's Islamic revolution and its appearance of being a Pan-Islamic force in contrast to Iraq's Arab nationalism. Despite Iraq's goals of regaining the Shatt al-Arab, the Iraqi government seemed to initially welcome Iran's Revolution, which overthrew Iran's Shah, seen as a common enemy. It is difficult to pinpoint when tensions began to build.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 brought the 1975 agreements into questionable standing. Border clashes began occurring from time to time while signs of Iranian interference in Iraq were pronounced. Leaders of Iran's Islamic republic indicated their desire to "export" the revolution's concept of Islamic governance guided by Shiʿi clergy. Ruhollah Khomeini, the ideological architect of the revolution, had already found an audience for his ideas in Iraq when he was living there during his exile. In April 1980 the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, survived an assassination attempt by Iraqi Shiʿis sympathetic to the Iranian Revolution.

Meanwhile, Iran's new government—then at loggerheads with the United States over the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants—was in apparent isolation and disorder, and its regular armed forces were gutted and demoralized. Saddam, who had considered the 1975 agreements lopsided, saw in this an opportune moment to reassert territorial claims he had previously conceded, notably the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab. He made additional demands as well, including some form of Arab self-determination in Khuzestan, a rich oil-producing border region in Iran that was inhabited largely by ethnic Arabs. He also demanded that Iran relinquish control of the islands of Abū Mūsa and Greater and Lesser Ṭunb, Persian Gulf islands which were controlled by the Arab sheikhdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, respectively, under the British protectorate. They had been seized by Iran in 1971 when the protectorate ended.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on Iraqis to overthrow the Ba'ath government, which was received with considerable anger in Baghdad. On July 17, 1979, despite Khomeini's call, Saddam gave a speech praising the Iranian Revolution and called for an Iraqi-Iranian

friendship based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. When Khomeini rejected Saddam's overture by calling for Islamic revolution in Iraq, Saddam was alarmed. Iran's new Islamic administration was regarded in Baghdad as an irrational, existential threat to the Ba'ath government, especially because the secular Ba'ath party discriminated against and posed a threat to the Shia movement in Iraq, whose clerics were Iran's allies within Iraq and whom Khomeini saw as oppressed.

7.2)Results of the War and International Reactions

Open warfare began on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi armed forces invaded western Iran along the countries' joint border, though Iraq claimed that the war had begun earlier that month, on September 4, when Iran shelled a number of border posts. Fighting was ended by a 1988 ceasefire, though the resumption of normal diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of troops did not take place until the signing of a formal peace agreement on August 16, 1990.

Several factors influenced Saddam Hussein's decision to attack Iran. First, Hussein's iron-fisted efforts to forge a cohesive, secular Iraqi nation-state among hostile ethnic groups and religious sects faced tremendous challenges from Iran's fundamentalist revolution. Hussein viewed Iranian officials' inflammatory plans to incite revolution throughout the Middle East as a threat to Arab and Iraqi influence in the Persian Gulf area. For example, Iran's leaders and its Shia majority population touted a "brotherhood" with the politically repressed but majority Shia population in Iraq.

Second, the ongoing revolution diminished Iran's regional influence. Khomeini wrestled to consolidate his leadership as diverse political groups vied for power. Further, to ensure the loyalty of the military to the new rulers, Iran's revolutionary leaders executed, imprisoned, or expelled thousands of officers. Hussein tried to expand Iraq's influence and rebellion by exploiting Iran's apparent weakness. Khomeini settled in Iraq in 1962 after fleeing persecution in Iran. In 1977, Hussein expelled Khomeini, who fled to France, where he pledged to avenge Hussein's repression of Shias. In 1980, as political leader of Iran, Khomeini encouraged the overthrow of Hussein. Finally, a chronic border dispute with Iran offered an excuse for Iraq to attack.

The war proceeded in three phases. Initially, along the northern and central regions of the Iran-Iraq border, Iraqi forces overwhelmed weak resistance to capture substantial Iranian territory. The main attack occurred in the south, however, along the hotly disputed border adjacent to the Persian Gulf. Iraqi forces quickly advanced almost eighty kilometers (about fifty miles) into Iran's Khūzestān region. The advance stalled in the cities of Ābādān and Khorramshahr, where Iraqis could not subdue resistance in grueling house-to-house fighting. This resistance especially frustrated Hussein, who had expected ethnic Arabs in the region to turn against the Persian Iranians.

Iranian leaders quickly mobilized three military forces: the Basij (People's Militia), pasdaran volunteers ages nine to fifty who were deeply committed to the Iranian revolution and Islamic government but lacked military training and adequate equipment, and formal armed forces comprising former military officers and pilots released from prison. By late 1981, Iranian forces could coordinate operations and launch modestly successful counteroffensives. These assaults occasionally involved "human wave" attacks by thousands of pasdaran or Basij volunteers. Such assaults sought to overwhelm Iraqi troops by sheer force of numbers, and often thousands of Iranians died in a single battle.

The second phase of the war began in mid-1982, when Iran launched a highly successful offensive that demoralized the Iraqis by recapturing important towns and territory. In May and June, 1982, Hussein offered to withdraw Iraqi troops from Iranian territory, but Khomeini refused to stop fighting. Iran attacked deeper into Iraqi territory and more frequently used human-wave assaults. Neither country could win a decisive victory in 1983. Iraq appeared unable to win the war at all, but Iran could perhaps "win" a long, lethal, and exhausting war of attrition.

The third phase of the war, the war of attrition, began early in 1984 when Hussein adopted a new strategy: He would prevent Iranians from capturing Iraqi territory, draw great powers into the conflict, and impose unbearable costs on Iran. Three new tactics accompanied this new strategy: Iraq used chemical weapons to repel human-wave attacks and kill huge numbers of Iranians, attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf (in what became known as the Tanker War), and attacked Iranian cities with missiles and artillery (the War of the Cities).

7.2.1)CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF CONFLICTS

1980–81: Iraqi Offensive and Iranian Pushback

In September 1980 the Iraqi army carefully advanced along a broad front into Khuzestan, taking Iran by surprise. Iraq's troops captured the city of Khorramshahr but failed to take the important oil-refining center of Abadan. By December 1980 the Iraqi offensive had bogged down about 50–75 miles (80–120 km) inside Iran after meeting unexpectedly strong Iranian resistance. The zeal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), an Iranian state militia initially tasked with safeguarding the Islamic Revolution from internal threats, proved effective: a victory by the militia in April 1981 convinced the Iranian leadership to amplify its role in combat and promote its development. In the months ahead Iraqi forces were compelled to give ground, and in September Iranian forces pushed the Iraqis back across Iran's Karun River.

1982–87: Iranian offensive, stalemate, and the Tanker War

In May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr. Iraq voluntarily withdrew its forces from all captured Iranian territory soon after and began seeking a peace agreement with Iran.

But under the leadership of Ruhollah Khomeini, who saw Saddam as an obstacle to the Islamic Revolution, Iran remained intransigent and continued the war in an effort to overthrow the Iraqi leader. In July Iranian forces invaded Iraq's Al-Baṣrah province. Iraq's defenses solidified once its troops were defending their own soil, and the war settled down into a stalemate with a static, entrenched front running just inside and along Iraq's border.

Iran repeatedly launched fruitless infantry attacks, using human assault waves composed partly of untrained and unarmed conscripts (often young boys snatched from the streets), which were repelled by the superior firepower and air power of the Iraqis. Both nations engaged in sporadic air and missile attacks against each other's cities and military and oil installations.

Despite the conflict being focused in oil-rich regions, the disruption to the global oil flow had been hitherto minimal. But in 1984, with no end to the war in sight, the two countries began attacking each other's oil-tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iran also attacked tankers headed to and from Kuwait and other Gulf states, prompting the United States and several western European nations to station warships in the Persian Gulf to ensure the flow of oil to the rest of the world. The so-called Tanker War, which included strikes on more than 100 oil tankers, marked an increase in international interest and involvement in the conflict.

The Tanker War erupted dramatically in March, 1984. Iraq sought to break the military deadlock by attacking tankers carrying Iranian oil for export and thus curbing Iran's oil revenues. Hussein apparently hoped that Iran would blockade all oil shipping, thereby provoking Western powers to intervene to end the war. Iran retaliated by attacking ships too, especially vessels leaving or approaching Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iran was punishing Kuwaiti and Saudi leaders for supplying Hussein with cash and equipment. Shipping attacks decreased Iraq's oil exports by 70 percent and Iran's by 50 percent. Total shipping in the Persian Gulf dropped by 25 percent. By 1987 many tankers, especially those from Kuwait, had "reflagged"; that is, they sailed under the American or Soviet flags, thereby engaging the defenses of the U.S. or Soviet navies.

The Tanker War continued into 1987, when an Iraqi missile struck the USS Stark, killing thirty-seven crew members. The United States blamed the Iranians for provoking the conflict and announced intentions to stand by its regional allies. Pro-Western Arab governments were skeptical, as earlier news had revealed that U.S. president Ronald Reagan's administration had authorized illegal arms sales to Iran. By 1988, ships from eighteen national navies were patrolling the Persian Gulf, more than four hundred sailors had died, hundreds of ships had been attacked, more than eighty of which suffered serious damage, and ship owners and insurers had suffered losses and damage totaling millions of dollars.

The oil-exporting capacity of both nations was severely reduced at various times as a result of air strikes and pipeline shutoffs, and the consequent reduction in their income and foreign-currency earnings brought the countries' economic development programs to a near

standstill. Iraq's war effort was openly financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighboring Arab states and was tacitly supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, while Iran's only major allies were Syria and Libya.

In 1987 the military balance began to favor Iraq, which had raised an army of about one million and had obtained state-of-the-art arms from France and the Soviet Union, including thousands of artillery pieces, tanks, and armored personnel carriers and hundreds of combat aircraft. This arsenal (enormous for a country of some 18 million inhabitants) was bolstered by the addition of substantial quantities of chemical weapons, which the regime acquired or produced throughout the 1980s. At the same time, Iraq committed substantial resources in an attempt to develop or purchase other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including biological and nuclear arms.

In July 1987 the UN Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging Iraq and Iran to accept a ceasefire, withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle their frontier disputes by negotiations held under UN auspices. Iraq agreed to abide by the terms if Iran reciprocated. Iran, however, demanded amendments condemning Iraq as the aggressor in the war (which would have held them liable for paying war reparations) and calling on all foreign navies to leave the gulf.

1988: Escalation and ceasefire

In early 1988 Iranian forces, in cooperation with Iraqi Kurds, threatened the area from Kirkuk to the Turkish border and penetrated to the towns of Hājj ʿUmrān and Ḥalabjah in Iraq's northeastern provinces. They met with stiff resistance in the north, however. Using chemical weapons, Iraqi forces killed as any as 5,000 Kurdish civilians in and around Ḥalabjah in March 1988.

Military operations in the gulf resumed, and in April 1988 Iraq—this time using chemical weapons against the Iranian troops—recaptured the Fāw peninsula. Later it liberated the districts of Salamcha and Majnūn, and in July Iraqi forces once again penetrated deep into Iran. That same month Iran Air flight 655, a passenger plane, was shot down by a U.S. missile cruiser after being mistaken for a fighter jet. The tragedy, which left 290 dead, accentuated the heavy toll the war had taken on civilians in Iran. Now war-weary, Iran finally accepted United Nations Resolution 598 on July 20, and the ceasefire came into force on August 20, 1988.

7.2.2)Casualties

The war had been one of the most destructive conflicts of the late 20th century. The total number of combatants on both sides is unclear, but both countries were fully mobilized, and most men of military age were under arms. The number of casualties was enormous but equally uncertain. Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number.

The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the greatest losses. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi forces during the series of campaigns code-named Anfāl (Arabic: “Spoils”) that took place in 1988 (see Kurd).

At the time of the conflict, the United Nations Security Council issued statements that “chemical weapons had been used in the war.” UN statements never clarified that only Iraq was using chemical weapons, and according to retrospective authors “the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian[s] as well as Iraqi Kurds.” The Security Council did not identify Iraq as the aggressor of the war until December 11, 1991, 12 years after Iraq invaded Iran and 16 months after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

8)Invasion of Kuwait

8.1)Reason of the Invasion

During the early morning hours of August 2, 1990, Iraqi armed forces suddenly invaded neighboring Kuwait, resulting in the looting of that small country and the brutalization of the Kuwaiti people. This act of aggression was the result both of trends that had been developing in the upper Persian Gulf region for several years and of specific problems that, when combined, led to an escalation of Iraqi-Kuwaiti tensions and, ultimately, invasion.

In the broadest sense, three closely interconnected factors contributed to an increasingly explosive situation in the Persian Gulf region. First, throughout the 1980’s, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein had systematically and often brutally eliminated all sources of rival political power in Iraq while simultaneously concentrating all power and authority around himself. For example, during the late 1980’s, Hussein crushed the Kurdish minority within Iraq, allegedly using chemical weapons to suppress the Kurds and sending more than sixty thousand refugees into Iran and Turkey. Furthermore, the Iraqi authorities forcibly resettled more than half a million Kurds away from the border to secure the frontier areas. Meanwhile, throughout the 1980’s, Hussein effectively excluded independent elements of the ruling Ba′th Party from power and increasingly surrounded himself with associates who were disinclined to provide him with independent advice. This served to isolate the Iraqi president, a trend that was particularly dangerous in view of his lack of personal experience with the Western powers and limited experience even within the Arab world.

Second, in the aftermath of the Iraqi victory over Iran in the lengthy Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iraq emerged as the dominant indigenous military power in the Persian Gulf region. At the conclusion of that war, Iraq’s military consisted of more than one million men, including the sizable and well-equipped Republican Guard. In addition, during the Iran-Iraq

conflict, the Iraqis had invested heavily in defense industries, particularly in chemical weapons production and the development of missile technology. Following the cessation of hostilities with Iran, the Iraqi authorities continued to emphasize the expansion of Iraq's high-tech armaments industry. In short, as Baghdad entered the 1990's, Iraq's military, backed by the Iraqi defense industrial establishment, placed Saddam Hussein in a strong position to influence Persian Gulf affairs along desired lines.

Third, against the backdrop of his monopolistic consolidation of political power domestically and Iraq's postwar military dominance in the Persian Gulf region, Hussein increasingly aspired to leadership of the entire Arab world. The Iraqi president apparently believed that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the growing internal political, ethnic, and economic chaos within the Soviet Union, combined with other changes in the international power configuration, created an opportunity in which an Iraqi-led coalition of revolutionary Arab states could assert itself and emerge as a more powerful, perhaps regionally dominant, actor in the international arena.

As part of his effort to assert his leadership within the Arab world, Hussein directed his rhetoric against Israel, the traditional adversary of the Arabs. On April 2, 1990, he articulated a new deterrence policy for Iraq under the terms of which, should Israel attack Iraq, as it had in 1981 when the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor, Iraq would respond with a chemical attack on Israel. Later, the Iraqi president said that Iraq would extend this deterrent umbrella to any Arab state desiring Iraqi assistance. Simultaneously, Hussein attempted to consolidate additional support for his effort to assert leadership throughout the Arab world by promising Iraqi support for the Palestinian cause. Hussein's bold new military deterrence doctrine directed toward Israel, combined with his encouragement of the Palestinians and other, similar measures designed to appeal to the Arab masses, allowed the Iraqi president to reap a swell of popular support throughout the entire Arab world.

Notwithstanding Iraq's regional military power, along with Hussein's effective concentration of political power within Iraq and his growing prestige as a pan-Arab leader in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was confronted by a series of serious problems that threatened to jeopardize Hussein's ambitions for himself and Iraq. The central problem was financial: Iraq emerged from its war with Iran with an estimated debt of eighty billion dollars, thirty to thirty-five billion dollars of which consisted of short-term loans owed to the Western powers, with the remainder owed to the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The debt problem was further compounded by Iraq's postwar policy of continued heavy investment in its high-tech defense industry as well as highly ambitious reconstruction projects in war-damaged areas of Iraq and the importation of consumer goods and food from abroad, all requiring additional hard currency. Finally, Iraq's already high demand for foreign exchange was further amplified by its annual debt service requirements of six to seven billion dollars.

Iraq hoped to meet its financial needs by increasing oil revenues. This hope was predicated on predictions of oil price increases. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, when the price of oil

declined from twenty dollars to fourteen dollars per barrel during a six-month period between January and June, 1990, they faced a serious short-term financial shortfall. Many Iraqis blamed the Western powers, arguing that the decline in oil prices was part of a larger Western conspiracy in which the West had manipulated the oil market so as to create financial hardship for Iraq and thereby force Hussein's government to abandon its regional policies and ambitions.

Hussein also accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of "cheating" on OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) production quotas, thereby further contributing to the decline in oil prices. Tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were further exacerbated by Kuwait's refusal to forgive the debt owed to it by Iraq. In short, rather than recognizing the underlying sources of Iraq's financial instability and adopting effective measures to reorder spending priorities and place Iraq on a sound financial footing, Hussein instead blamed the Western powers, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates for Iraq's financial problems.

In addition to its financial differences with Kuwait, Iraq also had a series of territorial disputes with its southern neighbor. Prior to relinquishing claim to all of Kuwaiti territory in 1963, Iraq had made periodic attempts to assert full Iraqi control over the entirety of Kuwait. After 1963, although Iraqi claims against Kuwaiti territory became more limited in scope, such claims remained a topic of contention between the two states. One dimension of the dispute centered on the Khawr Abd Allah estuary, which constitutes the maritime portion of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and leads to the Iraqi naval base and port at Umm Qasr. Kuwait applied the midchannel doctrine to divide the estuary, whereas Iraq claimed the entire waterway. Moreover, Iraq sought to obtain control of Būbiyān and Warbah islands from Kuwait, as these islands effectively controlled the estuary's entrance. Kuwait, of course, rejected Iraq's claims, but the Iraqis thought it was vital for Iraq's national security and the success of their political, economic, and military ambitions to obtain full Iraqi control over this important outlet to the Persian Gulf.

In addition to the Khawr Abd Allah waterway dispute, the Iraqis claimed ownership of the entire Rumaila oil field, which lay on both Iraqi and Kuwaiti territory. In addition, Iraq accused Kuwait of pumping from the Rumaila field and selling the oil at considerable profit during the Iran-Iraq War. Hussein's government demanded that the border be revised in accord with Iraq's claims to the entire Rumaila field and that Kuwait pay Iraq two billion dollars for the oil allegedly pumped earlier from the disputed field. Kuwait also rejected these claims, thereby leading to further estrangement between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi governments.

Finally, in the broadest sense, the Iraqi authorities capitalized on popular Arab resentment of the wealthy, conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In this sense, Saddam Hussein was able to frame Iraq's financial and territorial disputes with Kuwait within the larger ideological rivalry between revolutionary pan-Arabism and the conservative monarchies of the Arab world.

8.2)The Process of the War

Tensions in the Persian Gulf began to build during the summer of 1990, with Iraq adopting an increasingly belligerent tone toward both Kuwait and members of its ruling Ṣabāḥ dynasty. On July 17 Saddam launched a televised verbal attack on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for exceeding the oil export quotas that had been set for them by OPEC. A day later Kuwait was accused of stealing oil from the Al-Rumaylah oil field, which straddles the border between Iraq and Kuwait. As criticism mounted, talks between the two countries in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, broke down on August 1. Hours later, early on August 2, Iraqi armoured divisions invaded Kuwait despite personal assurances from Saddam to Egyptian Pres. Hosni Mubarak that Iraq would avoid using force to press its claims against Kuwait.
Active resistance to the invasion lasted about 14 hours, during which time an estimated 4,200 Kuwaitis were killed in combat. Although remnants of Kuwait's 20,000-man army maintained a spirited defense over the next 36 hours, the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait city was completed with little difficulty. The fiercest opposition came at Dasman Palace, the royal residence of emir Sheikh Jābir al-Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ, which only yielded to the Iraqis after hours of bitter hand-to-hand fighting in which the emir's younger brother, Sheikh Fahad, was killed. At 11:11 am on August 3 Kuwait Radio fell silent with these words: "Arabs, brothers, beloved brothers, Muslims. Hurry to our aid." Sheikh Jābir, his cabinet, and senior members of the Ṣabāḥ family fled to Saudi Arabia to establish a government-in-exile. Crown prince Saʿd al-ʿAbd Allāh al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ quickly emerged as the dominant personality within this group, and finance minister Sheikh Ali al-Khalifah al-Ṣabāḥ took control of most of Kuwait's overseas assets, which amounted to some $100 billion. As many as 350,000 Kuwaiti refugees also fled south into Saudi Arabia.

On August 4 Iraqi occupation forces appointed Col. Alaa Hussain Ali as head of state of Kuwait; he was backed by a nine-member cabinet of "revolutionaries" who, Iraq said, were responsible for ousting remnants of the previous regime. On August 8 the Iraqis installed the Provisional Free Government of Kuwait, a body that was established to give credence to Iraq's dubious claim that the invasion was conducted at the request of Kuwaitis opposed to the Ṣabāḥ dynasty. On August 10 foreign diplomats were given a two-week deadline to close their embassies in Kuwait and move to Baghdad. On August 28 Saddam declared that Kuwait was now the 19th province of Iraq. Place-names were "Iraqized," and the southern Iraqi province of Al-Baṣrah was extended to include the Kuwait side of the Al-Rumaylah oil field as well as the islands of Būbiyān and Al-Warbah at the head of the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab waterway.

During the occupation of Kuwait, Iraqi troops began a systematic campaign of pillage, rape, torture, murder, and theft of Kuwait's economic assets. The Iraqi occupation government announced the death penalty for looters but condoned the removal to Baghdad of medical equipment from hospitals, the assets of the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, treasures of Islamic art from the Kuwait National Museum, and $1.6 billion in gold and cash from the Central Bank of Kuwait. Amnesty International reported that Iraqi soldiers had carried out hundreds of extrajudicial killings and taken several thousand Kuwaiti civilians prisoner. One

widely circulated story about Iraqi soldiers removing newborn infants from hospital incubators was eventually debunked as a fabrication, but the truth did not emerge until long after the conflict had been settled.

8.3)Opinions From the World

The diplomatic response to the invasion was swift. On August 6 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 661, which imposed a ban on all trade with Iraq and called on UN member countries to protect the assets of the legitimate government of Kuwait. A day later the first U.S. troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, while Mubarak invited Arab leaders to Cairo for an emergency summit. On August 10, 12 of the 21 Arab League countries passed a resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and endorsing the UN resolution. Among those Arab states sympathetic to Iraq were Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, and Algeria as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The key supporters of Kuwait, apart from Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, were Egypt and Syria, whose leaders had improved mutual relations in the months preceding the invasion. Saddam countered the Arab League resolution on August 12 by declaring that "all occupation problems, and those portrayed as occupation problems in the Middle East, can be resolved simultaneously and on the same principles and bases as should be set out by the UN Security Council." Saddam also used the crisis as an unlikely opportunity to conclude peace with Iran. On August 15 he announced that Iraq was ready to accept Iranian terms for the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War: the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, resolution of the Shaṭṭ Al-ʿArab waterway dispute, and a prisoner-of-war exchange. The Soviet Union, at first guarded in its response to the invasion, on September 3 expressed its support for the U.S. military presence in the Gulf.

More than 600,000 expatriates, including some 7,000 Western nationals, remained in Kuwait after the invasion, having been barred from leaving the country by Iraqi occupation authorities. The Iraqi regime began rounding up hundreds of Westerners and holding some of them at strategic military and industrial sites as "human shields" in the event of attack. On August 28, the same day that Iraq declared that it had annexed Kuwait, Saddam said that women and children would be allowed to leave. The plight of the remaining hostages resulted in a procession of Western politicians and celebrities to Baghdad. Among those appealing for the release of the hostages were former British prime minister Edward Heath, Labour politician Tony Benn, American heavyweight boxing champ Muhammad Ali. In a sudden and dramatic move, on December 6 Saddam announced that all remaining hostages would be released. Although this put the Iraqi government in compliance with Security Council Resolution 674—which demanded that "Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third State nationals hostage"—there remained the matter of Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait and the potential threat to Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer and exporter.

8.4)International Interventions

8.4.1)Operation Desert Shield

Saddam's conquest of Kuwait had been achieved in short order, and he seemed poised to continue his military push into Saudi Arabia. Conquering Saudi Arabia would give Saddam control of more than 40 percent of the world's oil reserves as well as two of the holiest sites in the Islamic world, Mecca and Medina. With Iraqi troops on the Saudi border, King Fahd, in an unprecedented move, invited Western and Arab forces to deploy in the kingdom in support of the Saudi defense forces. The U.S. immediately dispatched elements of its Rapid Deployment Force. This included the "ready brigade" of the 82nd Airborne Division, the U.S. Marine Corps First Expeditionary Force, and two squadrons of U.S. Air Force F-15s. Two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups were also deployed to the Persian Gulf. The U.S. ground contingent was a relatively lightly equipped "trip wire" force; even if Saudi Arabian and other Arab armies had rushed to the area, it is unlikely that the hastily assembled defenders could have repelled a concerted Iraqi attack. Nevertheless, this initial U.S. deployment deterred Saddam from attacking Saudi Arabia and initiating a war with the U.S. and its allies.

On paper, the Iraqi military looked formidable. Its army was the fifth largest in the world, with some 950,000 personnel, 5,500 main battle tanks, 10,000 additional armoured vehicles, and nearly 4,000 artillery pieces. The Iraqi air force consisted of some 40,000 personnel and 689 combat aircraft. Both the army and air force had extensive combat experience from the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), including the large-scale use of chemical weapons. Iraq was believed to also have a significant stockpile of biological agents, most notably weaponized botulinum toxin and anthrax. In addition, Iraq had a force of modified Soviet-made Scud surface-to-surface missiles mounted on mobile launchers. These missiles had an effective range of 185 miles (300 km) and were capable of carrying a payload of conventional explosives as well as chemical or biological weapons.

Over the following months the U.S. military carried out its largest overseas deployment since World War II. By mid-November the U.S. had more than 240,000 troops in the Gulf and another 200,000 on the way, and the United Kingdom had sent more than 25,000, Egypt 20,000, and France 5,500. Some 25 other countries, including Canada, Syria, Bangladesh, and Morocco, had committed troops and weapons to the military buildup that was designated Operation Desert Shield. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 by a vote of 12 to 2, sanctioning the use of force if the Iraqis had not left Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Only Cuba and Yemen voted against the resolution, with China abstaining. This was the first UN authorization of the use of force since 1950, when the Security Council approved military action against North Korea after its unprovoked attack on South Korea. With this resolution in place, the U.S. offered to engage in a dialogue with Saddam to extend the possibility of a peaceful settlement based on a timely Iraqi withdrawal.

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, had advised Bush that if the U.S. wished to use its military to liberate Kuwait, several conditions needed to be fulfilled. The force employed must be overwhelming and utilized as a last resort, the goals must be clear and accompanied by a coherent exit strategy, and the operation must have broad domestic and international support. In time these criteria would come to be known as the Powell Doctrine. Powell had served as a field-grade officer in Vietnam, the last major U.S. conflict, and had witnessed the dangers of "mission creep"—that is, the growth of a military operation beyond its original stated goals without a clear end. The Powell Doctrine was intended to prevent a repeat of the Vietnam War, and, as it was implemented in the Persian Gulf War, it was wholly successful.

Another legacy of Vietnam was a debate over the war-making powers of the president of the United States. Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives only Congress the power "to declare war" and "to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." Yet Article II says that the president is "commander in chief of the Army and Navy" and has the power, with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties with other nations. That ambiguity came to a head in 1973 during the Vietnam War, when Congress—over Pres. Richard Nixon's veto—passed the War Powers Act. That legislation required the executive branch to consult with Congress prior to major deployments of U.S. forces, but it was generally resisted or outright ignored by subsequent presidents. Bush, for his part, eventually sought congressional approval for the U.S. military operation in the Persian Gulf. On January 12, 1991, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution was passed by the House (250–183) and the Senate (52–47). It cited UN Security Council Resolution 678 as its casus belli, and Bush signed the measure into law on January 14. The UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was the following day.

8.4.2)Operation Desert Storm

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command(CENTCOM), directed the coalition military campaign, and his staff had devised a two-part operation that was designed to wear down Iraqi defenses before rapidly enveloping and destroying them. The two phases of Operation Desert Storm were a coalition air operation (January 17–February 24, 1991) and a ground offensive dubbed Operation Desert Sabre (February 24–28). Allied forces had three main objectives during the air campaign: to establish air supremacy, to destroy strategic targets, and to degrade Iraqi ground forces. Coalition pilots had gained air supremacy by January 28. The Iraqi air defense system of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft guns, and ground-controlled interception radars was rendered ineffective. Iraqi losses included some 35 aircraft downed in air-to-air combat, at least 100 destroyed on the ground, and 115 flown to Iran to avoid destruction. Allied losses totaled 39 aircraft; none were lost in air combat. Once coalition air forces had established control of the skies, they began destroying targets vital to the Iraqi war effort. These included command, control, and communications facilities; ammunition (including chemical and biological stores); petroleum, oil, and lubricant stockpiles; and manufacturing plants. Allied

aircraft also engaged in a protracted cat-and-mouse pursuit of Iraq's mobile Scud missile launchers. It was estimated that the air campaign neutralized some 30 percent of the Iraqi ground forces in the combat theatre.

While the air offensive was ongoing, coalition naval operations began in the Persian Gulf. The main objectives of the allied naval campaign were: to maintain a defensive screen around the six U.S. Navy aircraft carriers that were conducting operations in the gulf; to destroy the small but potentially effective Iraqi coastal defense navy; to clear Iraqi submarine mines from the combat theatre; and to threaten a major amphibious assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait. All of these objectives were fully achieved. By February 11 coalition forces had sunk the last Iraqi (and captured Kuwaiti) naval units. It was believed that coalition minesweepers had largely neutralized the threat of Iraqi sea mines, but on February 18 a pair of U.S. ships—the amphibious assault ship USS *Tripoli* and the guided missile cruiser USS *Princeton*—struck mines and suffered significant damage. On February 25 Iraqi ground forces launched a pair of Silkworm antiship missiles at the U.S. battleship *Missouri*. One of the missiles splashed harmlessly into the sea, and the other was intercepted by Sea Dart missiles fired from the British destroyer HMS *Gloucester*. The threat of an amphibious assault by the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary brigades (17,000 personnel) tied down six Iraqi divisions defending Kuwait's coastline.

On January 18 Iraq responded to the Allied air offensive by launching Scud missiles at the Israeli cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa in an effort to draw Israel into the conflict and splinter the Arab coalition. Two days later Scuds were fired at targets in Saudi Arabia. Between January 18 and February 25 Iraq fired 39 missiles at Israel, killing at least 3 Israeli civilians and injuring as many as 200. The U.S. exerted tremendous diplomatic pressure on Israel to refrain from retaliating directly against Iraq; Israel agreed but in exchange requested the immediate deployment of U.S. Patriot antiballistic missile defense systems from Europe to supplement existing Israeli Patriot batteries. The effectiveness of the Patriots remained an open question decades after the war concluded. The U.S. had initially boasted of a near perfect performance, but the Patriots' interception rate was soon downgraded by the U.S. Army to just 40 percent. Israeli military officials and the U.S. Government Accountability Office disputed even this modest estimate, stating that fewer than 10 percent of Patriots had successfully engaged and destroyed targeted Scuds.

8.4.3)Operation Desert Sabre

The United States Military took every opportunity to convince Saddam that a seaborne assault on the Kuwaiti coast would be a major part of the inevitable allied offensive, and Schwarzkopf himself made a highly publicized visit to marine amphibious units in the Persian Gulf to enhance that deception.

Operation Desert Sabre, the coalition ground offensive, began on February 24, 1991, with an advance to the Euphrates by the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd and 101st Airborne and

24th Infantry divisions, plus the French Daguet Division). Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions, along with Egyptian, Saudi, and other allied units, attacked Kuwait to tie down Iraqi forces. The main coalition attack was launched on February 25 by the U.S. VII Corps (1st and 3rd Armored, 1st Cavalry, and 1st Infantry divisions, as well as the 1st British Armoured Division). That same day the 1st and 2nd Marine divisions, having cleared extensive Iraqi minefields on the Kuwaiti frontier, sharply rebuffed a series of Iraqi armoured counterattacks and broke through to capture the airport in Kuwait city. On February 26–27 the VII Corps, along with the 1st British Armoured and 24th U.S. Infantry divisions, engaged and destroyed the Iraqi armoured reserves, including Saddam's elite Republican Guard divisions, near Basra. The remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait collapsed and fled to Basra, suffering heavy casualties and forcing Saddam to accept a cease-fire on February 28.

Operation Desert Sabre lasted just 100 hours. Large numbers of Iraqi troops surrendered without fighting, collapsing under the cumulative effects of the prolonged coalition air campaign and the concentrated firepower and speed of the ground advance.

8.5)Casualties, Kuwaiti oil fires

There are no official figures for the Iraqi military operation, leading to vastly differing figures of combatants and casualties. Estimates of the number of Iraqi troops in the Kuwait theatre range from 180,000 to 630,000, and estimates of Iraqi military deaths range from 8,000 to 50,000. Allied casualties, by contrast, were remarkably light. Just 147 U.S. personnel and 47 British troops were killed in action; for the duration of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, U.S. noncombat deaths actually exceeded combat fatalities in the Kuwaiti theatre. Approximately 1,000 coalition troops were wounded.

During their retreat from Kuwait, Iraqi troops set fire to oil storage installations and more than 700 of Kuwait's 950 oil wells, creating an environmental disaster that affected the entire region. A pall of dense smoke covered Kuwait, causing a slight fall in temperature and blotting out sunlight in Kuwait city. The fires emitted a toxic mixture of hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, and sulfur dioxide. Below the smoke, pollution was severe, with the number of soot particles about 1,000 times higher than normal. In nearby Bahrain May temperatures were 7 °F (4 °C) cooler than normal. Particles from the fires were detected more than 600 miles (965 km) away, and the massive injection of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere caused acid rain to fall as far away as the Black Sea and Pakistan. By November the fires, which had consumed about six million barrels of oil per day, had been extinguished, and temperatures and air quality in the area returned to normal values.

9. Questions to be Addressed

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10. Bibliography

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